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PROLOGUE

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ON BEHALF OF A
COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED BLACK GRADUATES
OF ABA ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOLS:
VICKY L. BEASLEY, DEVON W CARBADO,
TASHA L. COOPER, KIMBERLE CRENSHAW,
LUKE CHARLES HARRIS, SHAVARJEFFRIES,
SIDNEY MAJALYA,WANDA R. STANSBURY,
JORY STEELE, ET AL.,
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTSt
Luke Charles Harris*
The brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of a Committee of Concerned
Black Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools in Grutter v. Bollinger'
was written so as to intervene and to assist in the refraining of the public
debate surrounding minority admissions programs in institutions of
higher education.
Some commentators and social justice advocates have celebrated the
Supreme Court's decision in Grutter because it builds on Justice Louis
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.2 To be
sure, it does affirm and expand Justice Powell's use of the "diversity rationale" as a constitutional justification for affirmative action. In this respect,
Grutter represents a serious loss to the opponents of affirmative action. A
broad range of conservative organizations had hoped that the court would
use the Grutter decision to affirm the ideological triumph of a particular
vision of colorblindness under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. They hoped that, when there was no proof of intentional
discrimination, states would be forbidden from exposing and correcting
racial disparities. They also hoped that the Court would constitutionalize
a theoretical framework that normalizes an extraordinarily inegalitarian
t
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status quo, not only with respect to racial minority participation in higher
education, but in many other spheres of American life as well. In the end,
the Court did no such thing. It in no way endorsed a vision of colorblind
neutrality. Quite to the contrary, it proclaimed that states could both take
official notice of and act to address patterns of racial exclusion.
For these reasons, the Grutter decision should be celebrated. At the
same time, however, we must be careful not to lose sight of the danger
inherent in the current trajectory of equal protection jurisprudence. This
danger has to be uncovered and confronted in ways that resonate deeply
both with advocates of social justice and with the general public. In this
regard, we must consider what Grutterfailed to accomplish. Most importantly, it failed to connect the rationale for affirmative action policies to
historical and contemporary forms of racism. In this sense, Grutter, like
the Bakke decision before it, represents only a modest victory for the proponents of affirmative action. Unfortunately, the task of uncovering the
inadequacies of Bakke was largely ignored by the civil rights community
in favor of undertaking tremendous efforts to sanction the use of affirmative action programs within the narrow diversity framework. In some very
important respects, the civil rights community simply allowed issues of
distributive justice, unwarranted institutional exclusion, and community
interest to be taken off the table. In the aftermath of Grutter,we must not
repeat this error.
While civil rights advocates remained largely silent on these issues,
conservative think tanks, researchers, grass roots activists, and lawyers
worked hard to appropriate the language of the Civil Rights Movement
to create a common sensibility about the apparent contradictions between
affirmative action policies and colorblind justice. They maintained that, as
a general rule, the Equal Protection Clause compels us to ignore racial
categories in the formulation of state-sponsored public policies. Indeed,
they effectively framed affirmative action as measures inimical to the
American vision of equality. We must boldly challenge and vigorously
contest this misleading perspective. Our brief carefully reframes the terms
of the affirmative action debate by placing contemporary remedial concerns rooted in problems of institutional discrimination at its center.
Those concerns were not considered in the Grutter case.We contend that
remedying such problems will ultimately lead to more diverse environments in different domains of American life, with all of their attendant
benefits. Diversity, then, remains a major component of our analysis. We
argue, however, that it represents a complementary justification for affirmative action rather than the core justification for it.
What then are the weaknesses of the diversity rationale? To begin
with, it only legitimizes affirmative action on the grounds of institutional

FALL

2003]

Prologue

diversity.' Thus, it casts into the shadows a variety of social justice arguments for affirmative action that focus on the problems faced by the
members of racial minority groups that continue to suffer the effects of
historical and ongoing forms of systemic discrimination. By not focusing
on such concerns, the Bakke decision left open the implication that affirmative action initiatives are inextricably bound to a process tainted by
"reverse discrimination:' "preferential treatment," "unfairness to Whites"
4
and "the stigmatizing effects of affirmative action on racial minorities"
These notions continue to dominate and distort the public perceptions of
these programs to this day. Indeed, they are reflected in the Grutter decision and oral arguments. Through our brief we hope to assist in the
refraining of the national debate on these issues by introducing considerations that transcend, even as they incorporate, Justice Powell's diversity
rationale in the Bakke case.
At the heart of our argument is the notion that affirmative action
policies are not a matter of affording "preferential treatment" to their
beneficiaries. Rather, we maintain that these initiatives represent nothing
more than an attempt to offer their beneficiaries a greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked by pervasive inequalities: a context in
which many institutional practices serve to impede a fair assessment of the
capabilities of the beneficiaries of these programs. Affirmative action programs, then, are not simply a form of recompense for a history of slavery,
apartheid, and racism. Nor are they merely tools for the diversification of
academic environments. Instead, they are egalitarian measures designed
primarily to offset patterns of institutional discrimination in many different spheres of American life. Viewed from this perspective, the only
"burden" that Whites face in the context of the use of affirmative action
policies in higher education is the loss of the expected privilege that accrues to them when admissions officials who overemphasize the
importance of traditional conceptions of meritocracy evaluate members
of racial minority groups unfairly. Not surprisingly, then, we are deeply
skeptical of perspectives on affirmative action that concentrate excessively
on the perceived educational benefits of diversity for academic institutions
and too little on the unfair and unwarranted obstacles that confront minority students seeking to attend these institutions.
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This brief was also used to frame a series of discussions at the African American Policy Forum's (AAPF) two-day affirmative action
conference at Columbia Law School in March 2003. The conference
brought together academics, policy advocates, lawyers, and media experts
to discuss Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger' and the ongoing need for affirmative action policies to offhet institutional forms of discrimination in many
spheres of American life. Conference materials can be downloaded from
the AAPF's website at www.aapf.org.
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